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For nine decades, the central tenet of American wildfire policy was to protect 
natural resources and human communities from damages caused by wildfires. 
After 34 firefighters lost their lives on the front lines during a 1994 wildland fire 
in California, state and federal approaches to fire policy were irrevocably altered. 
Plagued by funding woes, climate change and increased development the US fire 
season grew longer, with already taxed firefighting personnel and equipment in 
perilously short supply. A collection of federal, state and community agencies are 
attempting to stem the tide, although require both social agreement and political 
action by state and federal government.  Long term economic and environmental 
implications of continued outbreaks are profound, and requires both a dedicated 
set of on-call firefighters, as well as equipment extensive enough to meet the 




The growth of the fire season throughout the continental United States is an issue that routinely 
impacts the basic needs and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands. From an environmental 
perspective, wildland fires have routinely worsened in the past twenty years due to a pattern of 
encroaching development, changing weather patterns and failed forest policy. As a consequence 
wildland fires have intensified, become increasingly resistant to fire management tactics, and are 
burning more acreage than at any point in recorded history. Collectively, these issues have 
culminated in a profound effect on both the environment and the United States Forest Service’s 
once unassailable policy of fire suppression.  
 
For nine decades, the central tenet of American wildfire policy was to protect natural resources 
and human communities from damages caused by wildfires, primarily losses of timber and 
homes (Busenberg, 2004, 146)
1
. After a 1910 Montana fire that burned over five million acres 
and killed 78 firefighters, the federal government decided to focus on fire suppression instead of 
prevention through the Forest Fires Emergency Act. Resulting in the 10 A.M. rule, all fires were 
intended not to exceed ten acres and to be extinguished before 10 A.M. (Busenberg, 2004, 147)
2
. 
As a practice which gave “low, ground fires, the opportunity to climb up into the forest canopy,” 
fire suppression inadvertently caused wildland fires to strengthen as a consequence of excess 




vegetation that had been traditionally disposed of through controlled burns (Pinchot, 2002, 2)
3
. 
The policy that emerged pushed a perspective of “forest fires as the moral equivalent of war to 
be fought in a paramilitary manner,” with battle lines being drawn reminiscent of a military 
operation (Hubbard, 2003, 1)
4
. Given a blank check, fire suppression “not only rewarded the 
Forest Service for putting out fires, it rewarded the Forest Service for spending a lot of money 
putting out fires,” effectively creating both budgetary and employment incentives to tackle the 




Fire suppression was to be incrementally phased out in 1978 with the abandonment of the Forest 
Fires Emergency Act given congressional concern regarding unsustainable costs. As timber 
yields decreased, priorities shifted, escalating after a series of catastrophic fires in the late 1980’s 
(including the famed Yellowstone fire which burned 36 percent of the park and spread 
throughout three states). Despite the damage from the Yellowstone blaze, Congress 
supplemented the Forest Service’s funding yet again through the creation of a contingency fund, 
completely undercutting the prior decision from 1978 (O’Toole, 2006,  219)
6
. Since 1993, this 
fund has been drawn upon every year despite pointed criticism from the General Accounting 




The 1994 fire season proved to be a catalyst within both the federal government and the Forest 
Service after 34 firefighters lost their lives on the front lines, dealing a third and fatal blow to the 
Forest Service’s policy of fire suppression. Following a lengthy investigation, the Forest Service 
determined that a sudden shift in wind (a primary ignition source) had altered the course of the 
fire, driving flames outside of the protected burn zone (Wuerthner, 2006, 56)
8
.The next major set 
of wildland fires occurred in 2000, spreading from the outskirts of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory in New Mexico to the foothills of the Bitteroot Mountain Range in Montana. 
Between these two geographic polar opposites, more than seven million acres burned at a 
cumulative cost of $1.3 billion dollars (Pinchot, 2002, 6)
9
. Unduly impacted by the La Nina 
weather system, a sizable majority of the West was classified as in drought-like conditions. 
29,000 firefighters were involved throughout the course of the fire season, leading to a scarcity 
of fire personnel, equipment and resources at both the burn zones and within a firefighter’s home 
community. Six years later, the 2006 fire season would cost $1.6 billion dollars, with 2012 
already poised to surpass this amount, further straining the contingency fund, and inviting yet 




Historically, fires were deemed an entity by the Forest Service, and not as part of a larger 
systemic framework influenced by other actors and localized policies (Kennedy, 2006, 80)
11
. 
Timothy Ingalsbee, the executive director of Firefighters United for Safety, Ethics and Ecology 
explains that part of the reason behind this singular focus is that “wildland firefighting strikes a 
resonant cord in the American people as … [the firefighting] continually reenacts the uniquely 
American experience of conquering the Western frontier and all the wild forces of nature” 
(Ingalsbee, 2006, 223)
12
. Although poetic, wildland firefighting has become distinct from 
municipality based fire services as well as other natural disaster recovery services (i.e., FEMA, 
etc…). In the wake of the 1994 fires, the United States Department of Agriculture and 
Department of Interior jointly “acknowledged the role of fire in healthy forests and in reducing 
the risk of large-scale wildfire” (Pinchot, 2002, 7)
13
. Consequently, the goal of federal wildland 
fire policy shifted to include “hazardous fuels reduction, ecosystem restoration, and community 




assistance” in addition to traditional fire protection, a practice which continues today, despite 




As with other environmental issues, human activity has played a significant role both through a 
deliberate action (i.e. starting a fire either intentionally or unintentionally), or as part of a pattern 
of growth and development that brought homes, businesses, and agriculture into rural canyons 
and other terrain traditionally prone to wildland fires. In their article, Conflict and Cooperation 
in Natural Resource Management, Mark Lubell and Brian Segee have termed the progression of 
infrastructure into previously deserted canyons (similar to residential and commercial growth 
within coastal areas), a “wildland-urban interface [that] has created daunting challenges for 





Combating wildland fires exceeds mere collaboration on community, budgetary, and personnel 
issues, particularly given the overall environmental impact of a wildland fire and specter of 
climate change. Roger Kennedy, a former director of the National Park Service, alludes to a 
“fiery Katrina” with the damage that erupted in New Orleans potentially occurring in a major 
Western city (Kennedy, 2006, 15)
16
. Given the political disagreement regarding if climate 
change is a looming environmental threat, an effort to forestall a repeat of a Hurricane Katrina-
sized event has led to a variety of political disputes over the direction of future forest policy.  
The primary object of this disagreement revolved around President George W. Bush’s push to 
enact the Healthy Forests Initiatives in 2003, a policy essentially involving the thinning of forests 
and the Forest Service’s later partial implementation (with only one-third the number of 
mandated projects being completed and/or fulfilled). Then United States Senator Larry Craig (R-
Idaho) excoriated the Forest Service in 2007, calling for more active management. Craig stated 
that the Forest Service should manage forests, not fires (Craig, 2007)
17
. Alternatively, Craig’s 
successor, Senator (and former Idaho Governor) Jim Risch also lambasted the Forest Service 
despite philosophical differences with Craig, albeit from the viewpoint that fires would be 




Their cause for concern stems from fire intensity and behavior being driven by three primary 
factors: weather, terrain, and fuel (Wuerthner, 2006, 54)
19
. Even more troubling, fire seasons are 
occurring earlier, particularly in areas of the world where wildland fires have historically been 
scarce (i.e., Brazil and Russia). Instead of a summer season encompassing three months, the new 
fire season often stretches from as early as March until as late as October in some areas of the 
West (Pyne, 2012)
20
. Weather is the most significant culprit behind this longevity, with warmer 
weather making the fuel-sustaining fires even drier and more explosive. During the recent 
wildland fires in Colorado earlier this summer, the temperature in Denver tied a historical record 
of 105 degrees two days in a row. Too much rain (or too little) often affects the ferocity of the 
fire, with the altitude of terrain impacting the available fuel (Porter, 2008, 219)
21
. Drought-like 
conditions create excess fuel by rendering trees and soil brittle, depriving land of the ability to 
efficiently absorb water. Alternatively, too much rain creates excessive vegetation also providing 
unneeded fuel. 
 
The gravitation towards forests as an ecosystem challenged the traditional overseer role imposed 
by the federal government in relation to forest policy and fire management. Historically, the 




rationale behind this transition involves traditionally low levels of state and local institutional 
capacity. As municipal and state efforts matured and took upon greater responsibility for forests 
within their respective jurisdictions, federal involvement invariably lessened. These changes 
were driven, in part, due to “the gradual realization by scientists and policymakers alike that 
there are limits to what can be accomplished by federal fire-control agencies,” effectively placing 
the burden on a shared partnership between states and the federal government (Davis, 2001,  
102)
22
. Demographic driven growth has also drawn additional attention, manpower and funding 
from the federal government, maximizing state clout. The impetus behind the demographic shift 
in the Western United States involves government subsidies. Increasingly allocated within flood 
plains and fire zones, subsidies threaten turning a “disaster into catastrophe,” if a wildland fire 
were to strike within denser and/or more populated localities (Kennedy, 2006, 16)
23
. Subsidizing 
residential and/or commercial property within these zones is a politically sensitive issue, similar 
in nature to that routinely faced by property owners in coastal areas. With wildland fires (and 
hurricanes) repeatedly reoccurring over the same geographic territory, subsidization ceases to 
become a financial question and one of safety and security.  
 
Some firefighters have often felt like stepchildren within both the Forest Service and the greater 
federal bureaucracy, with implementation occurring in a “piecemeal fashion and activities 
planned on an agency-by-agency and unit-by-unit basis” (Pinchot, 2002, 5)
24
. Peter Brierty, fire 
marshal for San Bernardino County, California (one of the largest counties in the United States 
in terms of acreage), was often “forced to beg for equipment and gear other fire departments took 





. Currently, the Forest Service is reliant on a patchwork of personnel from differing 
state agencies, a national pool of equipment, and an outsourcing of needed air equipment. 
Compared to most federal agencies, the Forest Service contracts and/or outsources a variety of 
responsibilities at the expense of a national fire department.  
 
Former firefighter Stephen Pyne compares firefighting to plumbing, explaining “like a faulty 
plumbing system, each fix only transfers the pressure to the next weak point” (Pyne, 2012)
26
. 
Despite an estimated annual two billion dollars spent on wildland fires throughout the United 
States, noticeable gaps remain (Kennedy, 2006, 81)
27
. As recently as June, National Guard 
airplanes sat on military runways while--bereft of needed air tankers--nearby towns burned 
across the state line. Investment in wildland fire specific equipment needs to increase, 
particularly given the creeping expansion of the fire season. New airplanes are routinely utilized 
in areas of Europe and other regions that routinely experience wildland fires, scooping up water 
from nearby lakes and adjacent rivers at 100 miles per hour without stopping (Associated Press, 
2012)
28
. The Forest Service, in contrast, is forced to use airplanes from 1954 that have an 
admittedly poor safety record. These planes must sit on an isolated tarmac to be slowly refueled 
by water trucks. As of this writing, two air tankers have crashed within recent weeks, resulting in 
the deaths of five Forest Service personnel and causing eight (or half) of the current fleet to be 
pulled out for inspection and/or service (Associated Press, 2012)
29
. President Barack Obama has 
ordered seven additional air tankers at a cost of $24 million dollars, although the initial allotment 




The gap in funding also impacts agency coordination. A government study, the National 
Cohesive Strategy for Wildland Fire Management, has composed a plan that involved three 




primary areas of concern: faulty past fire management through the emphasis on fire suppression, 
increased development in rural areas, and an absence of coordination between relevant federal, 
state and local government agencies (Pyne, 2004, 178)
31
. Although the Forest Service is the 
primary agency in charge of fire policy and forest management, another federal organization, the 
National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) in Idaho, acts as a clearinghouse between the Forest 
Service and an alphabet soup of federal agencies (in part given financial constraints). To give a 
greater sense of the bureaucracy involved, these agencies include: the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the 
National Weather Service, the Office of Aircraft Services and the National Association of State 




Within this context, “federal agencies share firefighting supplies, equipment, and personnel to 
facilitate efficient and cost-effective firefighting or disaster management” representing one 
method of federal and regional inter-agency collaboration (Pinchot, 2002, 16)
33
. Subgroups of 
the Center consist of the Wildland Fire Steering Group and the National Wildlife Coordinating 
Group, each comprised of 8-10 person teams that solicit input from states as well as individuals 
(the latter through a public comment period). NIFC’s closest counterpart at either a state and/or 
local level is the Great Plains Interstate Fire Compact (GPIFC), composed of South Dakota, 
North Dakota, Wyoming, Kansas and Colorado (Pinchot, 2002, 17)
34
. As with the federal 
agencies listed earlier, officials from each jurisdiction meet to share information, and lend assets 
ranging from heavy equipment to incident management teams.  
 
Community groups often form the third leg of the federal-state-county troika. Although lacking 
the traditional authority and financial wherewithal of federal and state officials, community 
groups include property owners. Given the responsibility to clear brush surrounding their 
properties (one of the most significant fuel load sources) and create defensible space, property 
owners are a form of proactive policymaking and the target audience of multi-jurisdictional 




Pyne concludes his argument, stating “effective fire management involves deciding how we live 
in and around our own lands, and that’s the rub. Why should wildland fire be different than other 
concerns that require social agreement and political action?” (Pyne, 2012)
36
. Government 
agencies are “the heart of policy implementation” (Lubell and Segee, 2010, 174)
37
. Any 
sustained accomplishment that reduces the impact of wildland fires (whether in regards to land, 
property or financial expense) will “require long-term coordinated efforts by federal and state 
governments, with robust partnerships between land-management agencies and the public in 
collaborative planning and stewardship” reiterating a three pronged approach between federal, 




Disasters the proportion of 1994, 2007 or this summer in Colorado are defining moments 
(Lubell, 2012)
39
. Shifts in population demographics have placed an increasing amount of people, 
property and livelihoods squarely in the path of future outbreaks. Such an attitude puts the 
burden on the property owners to create defensible space, protecting their single largest 
investment, livelihood, and often source of identity. To what extent can policymakers at all 
levels of government continue to have an impact through collaborative management, avoiding 
the fate which befell New Orleans post-Katrina? 





Notwithstanding the immediate financial cost, the long term economic and environmental 
implications of continued atypical outbreaks are profound. Within this new environment, the 
Forest Service requires both a dedicated set of on-call firefighters, as well as equipment 
extensive enough to meet the workload demanded not only by a major wildland fire, albeit that 
of two or three simultaneously. Fire suppression and Forest Service tactics continue to evolve 
through focusing on environmental and ecosystem related changes, although wildland fires 
continue to burn at historic proportions despite the alteration in policy. Until coordination is 
achieved and a national fire department is funded, fire management as a policy will continue to 
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